Core is manipulable via segmentation.

Any allocation rule that picks only core allocations is manipulable via segmentation. That is, there exists an economy with a coalition of agents such that, once this coalition splits momentarily from the rest of the economy and institutes the allocation rule within itself, no matter which individua...

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Publicado en:	Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 118; no. 1; pp. 103 - 118
Autores principales:	Sertel, Murat, Yildiz, Muhamet
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Academic Press Inc. September 2004
Materias:	Economic equilibrium Resource allocation > Mathematical models Core & periphery (Economic theory)
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost