Core is manipulable via segmentation.
Any allocation rule that picks only core allocations is manipulable via segmentation. That is, there exists an economy with a coalition of agents such that, once this coalition splits momentarily from the rest of the economy and institutes the allocation rule within itself, no matter which individua...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 118; no. 1; pp. 103 - 118 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
September 2004
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513172285&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513172285 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: September 2004 vid: 118 iid: 1 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513172285 10.1016/j.jet.2003.10.003 ppf: 103 ppct: 15 formats: tig: atl: Core is manipulable via segmentation. aug: au: Sertel, Murat Yildiz, Muhamet su: Economic equilibrium Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Core & periphery (Economic theory) sug: subj: Economic equilibrium Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Core & periphery (Economic theory) ab: Any allocation rule that picks only core allocations is manipulable via segmentation. That is, there exists an economy with a coalition of agents such that, once this coalition splits momentarily from the rest of the economy and institutes the allocation rule within itself, no matter which individually rational sub-allocation the complementary coalition picks, when we paste all the agents back together at their new endowments and apply the allocation rule to this “collage” economy, each member of the former coalition will be strictly better off than under direct application of the allocation rule to the original economy. Copyright (c) 2003 Elsevier (USA) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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