Factions and Political Competition.
This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Political Economy Vol. 119; no. 2; pp. 242 - 289 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
University of Chicago Press
April 2011
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513194836&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513194836 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223808 JPE jtl: Journal of Political Economy issn: 00223808 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: April 2011 vid: 119 iid: 2 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 513194836 0022-3808/2011/11902-0003510.00 ppf: 242 ppct: 47 formats: tig: atl: Factions and Political Competition. aug: au: Persico, Nicola Pueblita, José C. R. Silverman, Dan su: Factionalism Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Political competition Mathematical models sug: subj: Factionalism Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Political competition Mathematical models ab: This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|