Factions and Political Competition.
This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of...
| Published in: | Journal of Political Economy Vol. 119; no. 2; pp. 242 - 289 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
University of Chicago Press
April 2011
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. |
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