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Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.

This paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard. Specifically, we consider the false moral hazard model developed by Laffont and Tirole (1986). We first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions. We establi...

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Published in:Econometrica Vol. 79; no. 5; pp. 1499 - 1540
Main Authors: Perrigne, Isabelle, Vuong, Quang
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell September 2011
Subjects:
Moral hazard
Adverse selection (Insurance)
Information theory in economics
Contracts
Mathematical models
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost