Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.

This paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard. Specifically, we consider the false moral hazard model developed by Laffont and Tirole (1986). We first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions. We establi...

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Publicado en:Econometrica Vol. 79; no. 5; pp. 1499 - 1540
Autores principales: Perrigne, Isabelle, Vuong, Quang
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell September 2011
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.
      aug:
        au:
          Perrigne, Isabelle
          Vuong, Quang
      su:
        Moral hazard
        Adverse selection (Insurance)
        Information theory in economics
        Contracts
        Mathematical models
      sug:
        subj:
          Moral hazard
          Adverse selection (Insurance)
          Information theory in economics
          Contracts
          Mathematical models
      ab: This paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard. Specifically, we consider the false moral hazard model developed by Laffont and Tirole (1986). We first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions. We establish the nonparametric identification of the demand, cost, deterministic transfer, and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the model, which are the firm's type and the demand, cost, and transfer shocks. The cost of public funds is identified with the help of an instrument. Testable restrictions of the model are characterized. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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