Ill-Defined versus Precise Pre-Play Communication in the Traveler's Dilemma.
This article reports results from an experiment comparing the effects of vague versus precise pre-play communication in a highly competitive two-player game with conflicting interests. In the classic Traveler's Dilemma, non-binding precise messages about intent of play are pure cheap talk. We conjec...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 77; no. 2; pp. 351 - 369 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2010
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=54593435&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 54593435 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2010 vid: 77 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 54593435 10.4284/sej.2010.77.2.351 ppf: 351 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 9.5MB tig: atl: Ill-Defined versus Precise Pre-Play Communication in the Traveler's Dilemma. aug: au: Chakravarty, Sujoy Dechenaux, Emmanuel Roy, Jaideep affil: Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Kent State University, Kent, USA University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham su: Communication Decision making Economic research Numerical grid generation (Numerical analysis) Traveler attitudes Dilemma sug: subj: Communication Decision making Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities Economic research Numerical grid generation (Numerical analysis) Traveler attitudes Dilemma ab: This article reports results from an experiment comparing the effects of vague versus precise pre-play communication in a highly competitive two-player game with conflicting interests. In the classic Traveler's Dilemma, non-binding precise messages about intent of play are pure cheap talk. We conjecture that a form of imprecise pre-play communication whereby subjects can submit ill-defined messages may help foster cooperation because of their vagueness. Comparing behavior both across modes of communication and to a baseline case without communication, we find that cooperation is highest when players can communicate using precise numerical messages. When communication with ill-defined messages is allowed, then conditional on receiving a message, subjects act more cooperatively than when no message is received. However, overall, the ability to exchange ill-defined messages does not substantially improve cooperation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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