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HAVING KNOW-HOW: INTELLECT, ACTION, AND RECENT WORK ON RYLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE-HOW AND KNOWLEDGE-THAT.

Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge-how is non-propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory...

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Publicado en:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 91; no. 4; pp. 507 - 531
Autor principal: SAX, GREG
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2010
Materias:
Intellect
Theory of knowledge
Human behavior
Human acts (Ethics)
Linguistics
Deliberation
Philosophy
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost