HAVING KNOW-HOW: INTELLECT, ACTION, AND RECENT WORK ON RYLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE-HOW AND KNOWLEDGE-THAT.
Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge-how is non-propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory...
| Publicado en: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 91; no. 4; pp. 507 - 531 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=55532285&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 55532285 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02790750 PHZ jtl: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly issn: 02790750 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2010 vid: 91 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 55532285 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01376.x ppf: 507 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 129KB tig: atl: HAVING KNOW-HOW: INTELLECT, ACTION, AND RECENT WORK ON RYLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE-HOW AND KNOWLEDGE-THAT. aug: au: SAX, GREG affil: Department of Philosophy University of Michigan, Ann Arbor su: Intellect Theory of knowledge Human behavior Human acts (Ethics) Linguistics Deliberation Philosophy sug: subj: Intellect Theory of knowledge Human behavior Human acts (Ethics) Linguistics Deliberation Philosophy ab: Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge-how is non-propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory contradicts it. I show that they (and their interlocutors) misconstrue the distinction and Ryle's argument. Consequently, their objections fail. On my reading, Ryle's distinction pertains to, not knowledge, but an explanatory gap between explicit and implicit content, and his argument for it is sound. I defend the distinction's necessity in explaining human action and show that it propels a fruitful explanatory program. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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