A New Approach to Argument by Analogy: Extrapolation and Chain Graphs.
This essay sketches an account of extrapolation in terms of analogical reasoning that generalizes the notion of comparative process tracing. The account offered here relies on something known as chain graphs, which are used to explicate the role of "fingerprints," or distinctive markers, as a strate...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 77; no. 5; pp. 1058 - 1070 |
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| Formato: | Essay |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=59159622&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 59159622 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2010 vid: 77 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 59159622 10.1086/656543 ppf: 1058 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 5.4MB tig: atl: A New Approach to Argument by Analogy: Extrapolation and Chain Graphs. aug: au: Steel, Daniel affil: Kedzie Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824 su: Extrapolation Reasoning Analogy Markov processes sug: subj: Extrapolation Reasoning Analogy Markov processes ab: This essay sketches an account of extrapolation in terms of analogical reasoning that generalizes the notion of comparative process tracing. The account offered here relies on something known as chain graphs, which are used to explicate the role of "fingerprints," or distinctive markers, as a strategy for avoiding an underdetermination problem having to do with spurious analogies. Moreover, I show how the extrapolator's circle, one of the central challenges for extrapolation, is closely tied to distinctive markers and the Markov condition as it applies to chain graphs. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Essay src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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