The Demise of the Doomsday Argument.

Offers a refutation of the doomsday argument. Creation of the fallacy through a simple thought experiment analyzed in Bayesian terms; Assumption that a living person represents a random sample from the population of all persons who will ever have existed; Criteria for the applicability of time samp...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 111; no. 441; pp. 37 - 46
Autor principal: Sowers Jr., George F.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jan2002
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:Offers a refutation of the doomsday argument. Creation of the fallacy through a simple thought experiment analyzed in Bayesian terms; Assumption that a living person represents a random sample from the population of all persons who will ever have existed; Criteria for the applicability of time sampling arguments.