The Demise of the Doomsday Argument.
Offers a refutation of the doomsday argument. Creation of the fallacy through a simple thought experiment analyzed in Bayesian terms; Assumption that a living person represents a random sample from the population of all persons who will ever have existed; Criteria for the applicability of time samp...
| Publicado en: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 111; no. 441; pp. 37 - 46 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2002
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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