Explanation and description in computational neuroscience.

The central aim of this paper is to shed light on the nature of explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that computational models in this domain possess explanatory force to the extent that they describe the mechanisms responsible for producing a given phenomenon-paralleling how other mec...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 183; no. 3; pp. 339 - 374
Autor principal: Kaplan, David
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2011
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:The central aim of this paper is to shed light on the nature of explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that computational models in this domain possess explanatory force to the extent that they describe the mechanisms responsible for producing a given phenomenon-paralleling how other mechanistic models explain. Conceiving computational explanation as a species of mechanistic explanation affords an important distinction between computational models that play genuine explanatory roles and those that merely provide accurate descriptions or predictions of phenomena. It also serves to clarify the pattern of model refinement and elaboration undertaken by computational neuroscientists.