Explanation and description in computational neuroscience.

The central aim of this paper is to shed light on the nature of explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that computational models in this domain possess explanatory force to the extent that they describe the mechanisms responsible for producing a given phenomenon-paralleling how other mec...

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Published in:Synthese Vol. 183; no. 3; pp. 339 - 374
Main Author: Kaplan, David
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Dec2011
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        10.1007/s11229-011-9970-0
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        au: Kaplan, David
        affil: Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology, Washington University School of Medicine, 660 South Euclid Avenue Saint Louis 63110 USA
      su:
        Computational neuroscience
        Phenomenology
        Mechanism (Philosophy)
        Explanation
        Mathematical models
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          Computational neuroscience
          Phenomenology
          Mechanism (Philosophy)
          Explanation
          Mathematical models
      keyword:
        Computational models
        Mechanism
      ab: The central aim of this paper is to shed light on the nature of explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that computational models in this domain possess explanatory force to the extent that they describe the mechanisms responsible for producing a given phenomenon-paralleling how other mechanistic models explain. Conceiving computational explanation as a species of mechanistic explanation affords an important distinction between computational models that play genuine explanatory roles and those that merely provide accurate descriptions or predictions of phenomena. It also serves to clarify the pattern of model refinement and elaboration undertaken by computational neuroscientists.
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    language: English
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