MÁQUINAS SIN ENGRANAJES Y CUERPOS SIN MENTES. ¿CUÁN DUALISTA ES EL FUNCIONALISMO DE MÁQUINA DE TURING?
This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence betwee...
| Publicado en: | Revista de Filosofía (00348236) Vol. 67; pp. 183 - 201 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Universidad de Chile
2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |