MÁQUINAS SIN ENGRANAJES Y CUERPOS SIN MENTES. ¿CUÁN DUALISTA ES EL FUNCIONALISMO DE MÁQUINA DE TURING?
This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence betwee...
| Publicado en: | Revista de Filosofía (00348236) Vol. 67; pp. 183 - 201 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Universidad de Chile
2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=67372497&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 67372497 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00348236 2EMA jtl: Revista de Filosofía (00348236) issn: 00348236 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2011 vid: 67 pid: 30789 pub: Universidad de Chile artinfo: ui: 67372497 10.4067/s0718-43602011000100012 ppf: 183 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 371KB tig: atl: MÁQUINAS SIN ENGRANAJES Y CUERPOS SIN MENTES. ¿CUÁN DUALISTA ES EL FUNCIONALISMO DE MÁQUINA DE TURING? aug: au: González, Rodrigo affil: Universidad de Chile su: Dualism Materialism Mind & body Functionalism (Social sciences) Machinery Philosophy Descartes, René, 1596-1650 sug: subj: Dualism Materialism Mind & body Functionalism (Social sciences) Machinery Philosophy Descartes, René, 1596-1650 keyword: Mind-Body problem Turing Machine Functionalism dualismo Funcionalismo de Máquina de Turing materialismo problema mente-cuerpo ab: This article deals with how Turing Machine Functionalism turns out to be compatible with a form of Dualism, which involves that strong AI is not close to the original Materialism that inspired it in the nineteenth century. To support this thesis, I argue that there is a compelling coincidence between Descartes' philosophy and this version of Functionalism, since the former holds that it is conceivable/possible to separate mind and body, while the latter holds that it is not strictly necessary that mental states are realized by the physical properties of real cogs and machines. En este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo de Máquina de Turing resulta compatible con una forma de dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica o fuerte del materialismo que la inspiró originalmente en el siglo XIX. Para sostener esta tesis, argumento que efectivamente existe una notable cercanía entre el pensamiento cartesiano y dicho funcionalismo, ya que el primero afirma que es concebible/posible separar mente y cuerpo, mientras que el segundo sostiene que no es estrictamente necesario que los estados mentales se realicen en las propiedades físicas de engranajes y máquinas reales. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: Spanish refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (00348236) is the property of Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Filosofia y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Revista de Filosofía (00348236) holder: Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Filosofia y Humanidades dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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