Job Allocation Rules and Sorting Efficiency: Experimental Outcomes in a Peter Principle Environment.
An important issue in personnel economics is the design of efficient job allocation rules. Firms often use promotions both to sort workers across jobs and to provide them with incentives. However, the Peter Principle states that employees' output tends to fall after a promotion. Lazear (2004) sugges...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 78; no. 3; pp. 842 - 860 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2012
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=70698111&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 70698111 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2012 vid: 78 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 70698111 10.4284/0038-4038-78.3.842 ppf: 842 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Job Allocation Rules and Sorting Efficiency: Experimental Outcomes in a Peter Principle Environment. aug: au: Dickinson, David L. Villeval, Marie Claire affil: Appalachian State University, Department of Economics, Boone, NC 28608, USA University of Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France; Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique, 93 chemin des Mouilles, Ecully, F-69130, France (current address); Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany su: Employee promotions Organizational effectiveness Organization Wages Management sug: subj: Employee promotions Organizational effectiveness Organization Wages Management ab: An important issue in personnel economics is the design of efficient job allocation rules. Firms often use promotions both to sort workers across jobs and to provide them with incentives. However, the Peter Principle states that employees' output tends to fall after a promotion. Lazear (2004) suggests that self-selection may improve job allocation efficiency while preserving incentive effects. We reproduce this Peter Principle in the laboratory and compare the efficiency of a promotion standard with subjects self-selecting their task. We find no evidence of effort distortion, as predicted by theory. Furthermore, we find that when the Peter Principle is not severe, promotion rules often dominate self-selection efficiency of task assignment. Results are consistent with imperfect appraisal of transitory ability and a lack of strategic behavior. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|