Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.
We study a novel dynamic principal–agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model, an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Upon arrival of each task, the agent learns its level of d...
| Publicado en: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 79; no. 1; pp. 268 - 307 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2012
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=72135338&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 72135338 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2012 vid: 79 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 72135338 10.1093/restud/rdr026 ppf: 268 ppct: 39 formats: tig: atl: Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. aug: au: Gershkov, Alex Perry, Motty affil: Department of Economics and Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of Economics, University of Warwick su: Adverse selection (Commerce) Moral hazard Multiagent systems Task analysis (Education) Task assessment Risk management in business sug: subj: Adverse selection (Commerce) Moral hazard Multiagent systems Task analysis (Education) Task assessment Risk management in business keyword: Adverse Selection Adverse Selection ab: We study a novel dynamic principal–agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model, an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Upon arrival of each task, the agent learns its level of difficulty and then chooses whether to accept or refuse each task in turn and how much effort to exert. Although his decision to accept or refuse a task is publicly known, the agent's effort level is his private information. We characterize optimal contracts and show that the per-period utility of the agent approaches his per-period utility when his skills are publicly known, as the discount factor and the time horizon increase. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|