Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.

We study a novel dynamic principal–agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model, an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Upon arrival of each task, the agent learns its level of d...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Review of Economic Studies Vol. 79; no. 1; pp. 268 - 307
Autores principales:	Gershkov, Alex, Perry, Motty
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Oxford University Press / USA Jan2012
Materias:	Adverse selection (Commerce) Moral hazard Multiagent systems Task analysis (Education) Task assessment Risk management in business
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost