Cover Image
QR Code

The role of demand information and monitoring in tacit collusion.

Motivated by the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) models, we construct lab experiments to test the effects of two factors on collusion: information (regarding next period's demand state) and monitoring (of a rival's past action). Results indicate that information may facilita...

Full description

Published in:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 43; no. 1; pp. 78 - 100
Main Author: Rojas, Christian
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Spring2012
Subjects:
Economic demand
Economic efficiency
Rate of return
Economic research
Prediction theory
Stochastic analysis
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost

Internet

View this record in EBSCOhost