INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND BIDDING HETEROGENEITY IN SEALED BID AUCTIONS WHERE THE NUMBER OF BIDDERS IS UNKNOWN.
This article uses laboratory data from a series of first-price (FP) and second-price (SP) sealed bid auctions in which the number of bidders is unknown to test for possible deviations of individual behavior from theory and study the source of heterogeneity in bidding. In SP auctions we find a substa...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 50; no. 2; pp. 516 - 534 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2012
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=74195620&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 74195620 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2012 vid: 50 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 74195620 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00393.x ppf: 516 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 697KB tig: atl: INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND BIDDING HETEROGENEITY IN SEALED BID AUCTIONS WHERE THE NUMBER OF BIDDERS IS UNKNOWN. aug: au: ISAAC, MARK PEVNITSKAYA, SVETLANA SCHNIER, KURT S. affil: Isaac: Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306. Phone (850) 644‐7081, Fax (850) 644‐4535, E‐mail Pevnitskaya: Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306. Phone (850) 645‐1525, Fax (850) 644‐4535, E‐mail Schnier: Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303. Phone (404) 413‐0159, E‐mail su: Economic models Heterogeneity Risk aversion Risk-taking behavior Human behavior Economics Bids Bidders Auctions sug: subj: Economic models Heterogeneity Risk aversion Risk-taking behavior Human behavior Economics Bids Bidders Auctions ab: This article uses laboratory data from a series of first-price (FP) and second-price (SP) sealed bid auctions in which the number of bidders is unknown to test for possible deviations of individual behavior from theory and study the source of heterogeneity in bidding. In SP auctions we find a substantial amount of coincidence with theory. We observe systematic deviations from risk neutral bidding in FP auctions and show theoretically that these deviations are consistent with risk averse preferences. We find essentially no heterogeneity in bidding in SP auctions where risk preferences and the number of bidders do not affect the optimal bid, while in the FP auctions heterogeneity in bidding persists with experience. We find that heterogeneity in bidding in FP auctions is consistent with heterogeneity in risk preferences, the attempt to count the number of bidders in the auction, and bidder specific noise. ( JEL D44, C91) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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