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INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND BIDDING HETEROGENEITY IN SEALED BID AUCTIONS WHERE THE NUMBER OF BIDDERS IS UNKNOWN.

This article uses laboratory data from a series of first-price (FP) and second-price (SP) sealed bid auctions in which the number of bidders is unknown to test for possible deviations of individual behavior from theory and study the source of heterogeneity in bidding. In SP auctions we find a substa...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 50; no. 2; pp. 516 - 534
Autores principales: ISAAC, MARK, PEVNITSKAYA, SVETLANA, SCHNIER, KURT S.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Apr2012
Materias:
Economic models
Heterogeneity
Risk aversion
Risk-taking behavior
Human behavior
Economics
Bids
Bidders
Auctions
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost