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fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust.

This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by s...

Descripción completa

Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 368 - 391
Autores principales: Bigoni, Maria, Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof, Le Coq, Chloé, Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Summer2012
Materias:
Whistleblowers
Prices
Corruption
Fraud
Antitrust law
Fines (Penalties)
Cartels
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost