fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust.
This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by s...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 368 - 391 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Summer2012
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=76917932&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 76917932 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Summer2012 vid: 43 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 76917932 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x ppf: 368 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 710KB tig: atl: fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust. aug: au: Bigoni, Maria Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof Le Coq, Chloé Spagnolo, Giancarlo affil: University of Bologna; . Research Institute of Industrial Economics; . SITE and Stockholm School of Economics; . University of Rome Tor Vergata, SITE, EIEF, and CEPR; . su: Whistleblowers Prices Corruption Fraud Antitrust law Fines (Penalties) Cartels sug: subj: Whistleblowers Prices Corruption Fraud Antitrust law Fines (Penalties) Cartels ab: This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well-run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white-collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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