Rescuing dispositionalism from the ultimate problem: reply to Barker and Smart.
Barker and Smart have argued that dispositional monism is just as susceptible to the ultimate regress problem as Armstrong’s contingent necessitation view of laws. In this response, I consider what implications this conclusion has for the dispositional essentialist project more generally. I argue th...
| Publicado en: | Analysis Vol. 72; no. 4; pp. 723 - 732 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2012
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=82109819&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 82109819 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00032638 7OX jtl: Analysis issn: 00032638 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2012 vid: 72 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 82109819 10.1093/analys/ans112 ppf: 723 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 103KB tig: atl: Rescuing dispositionalism from the ultimate problem: reply to Barker and Smart. aug: au: Tugby, Matthew affil: University of Birmingham Birmingham B15 2TT, UK m.w.tugby@bham.ac.uk su: Essentialism (Philosophy) in literature Argument Spacetime Commitment (Psychology) Monism Disposition (Philosophy) Law (Philosophical concept) sug: subj: Essentialism (Philosophy) in literature Argument Spacetime Commitment (Psychology) Monism Disposition (Philosophy) Law (Philosophical concept) keyword: dispositions essentialism laws monism properties qualities ab: Barker and Smart have argued that dispositional monism is just as susceptible to the ultimate regress problem as Armstrong’s contingent necessitation view of laws. In this response, I consider what implications this conclusion has for the dispositional essentialist project more generally. I argue that it is the monistic aspect of dispositional monism, rather than the dispositional essentialist aspect, which is the source of the problem raised by Barker and Smart. I then outline a version of dispositional essentialism which avoids the ultimate problem by avoiding the commitment to monism. Despite the article by Barker and Smart, it is not time to give up on the dispositionalist project yet. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 The Analysis Trust. item: Analysis holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|