Rescuing dispositionalism from the ultimate problem: reply to Barker and Smart.

Barker and Smart have argued that dispositional monism is just as susceptible to the ultimate regress problem as Armstrong’s contingent necessitation view of laws. In this response, I consider what implications this conclusion has for the dispositional essentialist project more generally. I argue th...

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Publicado en:	Analysis Vol. 72; no. 4; pp. 723 - 732
Autor principal:	Tugby, Matthew
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Oxford University Press / USA Oct2012
Materias:	Essentialism (Philosophy) in literature Argument Spacetime Commitment (Psychology) Monism Disposition (Philosophy) Law (Philosophical concept)
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost