Bootstrapping our way to samesaying.
This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning affords an immediate appearance of de jure co-reference, (ii) flexibility: sameness of meaning tolerates open-ended variation in speakers' substantive understanding of the reference. Tr...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 189; no. 1; pp. 177 - 198 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning affords an immediate appearance of de jure co-reference, (ii) flexibility: sameness of meaning tolerates open-ended variation in speakers' substantive understanding of the reference. Traditional accounts of meaning have trouble simultaneously satisfying both constraints. I suggest that relationally individuated meanings provide a promising way of avoiding this tension. On relational accounts, we bootstrap our way to de jure co-reference: the subjective appearance of de jure co-reference helps make it the case that two token representations really do co-refer. |
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