Bootstrapping our way to samesaying.

This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning affords an immediate appearance of de jure co-reference, (ii) flexibility: sameness of meaning tolerates open-ended variation in speakers' substantive understanding of the reference. Tr...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 189; no. 1; pp. 177 - 198
Autor principal: Schroeter, Laura
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Nov2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Schroeter, Laura
        affil: The University of Melbourne, Parkville Australia
      su:
        Semantics
        Statistical bootstrapping
        Reference sources
        Epistemics
        Vocabulary
      sug:
        subj:
          Semantics
          Statistical bootstrapping
          Reference sources
          Epistemics
          Vocabulary
      keyword:
        Co-reference
        Frege's puzzle
        Meaning
        Reference
        Samesaying
      ab: This paper articulates two constraints on an acceptable account of meaning: (i) accessibility: sameness of meaning affords an immediate appearance of de jure co-reference, (ii) flexibility: sameness of meaning tolerates open-ended variation in speakers' substantive understanding of the reference. Traditional accounts of meaning have trouble simultaneously satisfying both constraints. I suggest that relationally individuated meanings provide a promising way of avoiding this tension. On relational accounts, we bootstrap our way to de jure co-reference: the subjective appearance of de jure co-reference helps make it the case that two token representations really do co-refer.
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    language: English
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