The Death of Expressed Personhood: A Neuroscientific Model to Solve Our Greatest Bioethical Dilemmas.
Defining "death" is central to addressing bioethical questions. Brain death is the most prominent legal definition of "death" in the US. Nonetheless, there seem to be notable difficulties with the notion of brain death that makes it inadequate to respond to ambiguous bioethical inquires. Jeff McMaha...
| Publicado en: | Dialogue (00122246) Vol. 55; no. 1; pp. 1 - 10 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Phi Sigma Tau
Oct2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Defining "death" is central to addressing bioethical questions. Brain death is the most prominent legal definition of "death" in the US. Nonetheless, there seem to be notable difficulties with the notion of brain death that makes it inadequate to respond to ambiguous bioethical inquires. Jeff McMahan aims to mend these limitations by positing a second notion of death: death of personhood. Although intuitive, the death of personhood does not acknowledge contemporary neuroscience research and posits dualist notions which we have good reason to doubt. Instead, a third notion of death is necessary: the death of expressed personhood. |
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