The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought.

According to the Generality Constraint, mental states with conceptual content must be capable of recombining in certain systematic ways. Drawing on empirical evidence from cognitive science, I argue that so-called analogue magnitude states violate this recombinability condition and thus have nonconc...

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Publicado en:	Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 121; no. 483; pp. 563 - 601
Autor principal:	BECK, JACOB
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Oxford University Press / USA Jul2012
Materias:	Mental health Cognitive science Philosophy of mind Cognitive psychology Supervenience (Philosophy) Thought & thinking Cognition Psychology
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost