The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought.
According to the Generality Constraint, mental states with conceptual content must be capable of recombining in certain systematic ways. Drawing on empirical evidence from cognitive science, I argue that so-called analogue magnitude states violate this recombinability condition and thus have nonconc...
| Publicado en: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 121; no. 483; pp. 563 - 601 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=85142577&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 85142577 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2012 vid: 121 iid: 483 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 85142577 10.1093/mind/fzs077 ppf: 563 ppct: 38 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.1MB tig: atl: The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought. aug: au: BECK, JACOB affil: York University, Toronto su: Mental health Cognitive science Philosophy of mind Cognitive psychology Supervenience (Philosophy) Thought & thinking Cognition Psychology sug: subj: Mental health Cognitive science Philosophy of mind Cognitive psychology Supervenience (Philosophy) Thought & thinking Cognition Psychology ab: According to the Generality Constraint, mental states with conceptual content must be capable of recombining in certain systematic ways. Drawing on empirical evidence from cognitive science, I argue that so-called analogue magnitude states violate this recombinability condition and thus have nonconceptual content. I further argue that this result has two significant consequences: it demonstrates that nonconceptual content seeps beyond perception and infiltrates cognition; and it shows that whether mental states have nonconceptual content is largely an empirical matter determined by the structure of the neural representations underlying them. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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