Tacit Collusion in Price-Setting Oligopoly: A Puzzle Redux.
We study tacit collusion in price-setting duopoly games with strategic complements and substitutes. While this problem has been considered by several studies, this article sheds new light on the comparison by focusing on the relationship between dynamic stability of equilibrium and tacit collusion....
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 79; no. 3; pp. 703 - 727 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=85157997&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 85157997 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2013 vid: 79 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 85157997 10.4284/0038-4038-2011.157 ppf: 703 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 13.5MB tig: atl: Tacit Collusion in Price-Setting Oligopoly: A Puzzle Redux. aug: au: Essen, Matt Van Hankins, William B. affil: Department of Economics, Finance, and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, 200 Alston Hall, Box 870224, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 su: Oligopolies Economic equilibrium Economic competition Collusion Pricing Algorithms sug: subj: Oligopolies Economic equilibrium Economic competition Collusion Pricing Algorithms ab: We study tacit collusion in price-setting duopoly games with strategic complements and substitutes. While this problem has been considered by several studies, this article sheds new light on the comparison by focusing on the relationship between dynamic stability of equilibrium and tacit collusion. We find when controlling for the absolute slope of the reaction functions, there are no robust differences in either the convergence properties or tacit collusion between complements and substitutes treatments. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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