Tacit Collusion in Price-Setting Oligopoly: A Puzzle Redux.

We study tacit collusion in price-setting duopoly games with strategic complements and substitutes. While this problem has been considered by several studies, this article sheds new light on the comparison by focusing on the relationship between dynamic stability of equilibrium and tacit collusion....

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Publicado en:	Southern Economic Journal Vol. 79; no. 3; pp. 703 - 727
Autores principales:	Essen, Matt Van, Hankins, William B.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Jan2013
Materias:	Oligopolies Economic equilibrium Economic competition Collusion Pricing Algorithms
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost