THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTIONISM.
In this paper I am interested in which reductionist positions are blocked, and on what grounds, by the Open Question Argument (OQA) both historically and by its contemporary guises. I single out four most salient interpretations of the OQA and analyze their impact on the possibility of reductionist...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 81; no. Supp; pp. 37 - 51 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2012 Supplement
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In this paper I am interested in which reductionist positions are blocked, and on what grounds, by the Open Question Argument (OQA) both historically and by its contemporary guises. I single out four most salient interpretations of the OQA and analyze their impact on the possibility of reductionist theories of evaluative properties. It will be suggested that the OQA poses a serious threat to semantic naturalism about moral terms, but does not block the possibility of metaphysical ethical naturalism (though possibly condemns it to a certain schizophrenia). Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kokių reduktyvizmo formų galimybę blokuoja vadinamasis atvirojo klausimo argumentas (AKA) -- tiek savo istoriniu, tiek šiandieniais pavidalais -- ir kokiu pagrindu. Išskirtos keturios svarbiausios AKA interpretacijos ir išanalizuotas jų poveikis vertinamųjų savybių reduktyvistinių, teorijų galimybei. Teigiu, jog AKA kelia didelę grėsmę semantiniam etiniam natūralizmui, tačiau ne metafiziniam etiniam natūralizmui (nors ir pasmerkia jį tam tikrai „šizofrenijai"). |
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