Norms of assertion and communication in social networks.

Epistemologists can be divided into two camps: those who think that nothing short of certainty or (subjective) probability 1 can warrant assertion and those who disagree with this claim. This paper addressed this issue by inquiring into the problem of setting the probability threshold required for a...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 190; no. 13; pp. 2557 - 2572
Autores principales: Olsson, Erik, Vallinder, Aron
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Sep2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Norms of assertion and communication in social networks.
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          Olsson, Erik
          Vallinder, Aron
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Kungshuset Lundagård 222 22 Lund Sweden
      su:
        Assertions (Logic)
        Social networks
        Computer simulation
        Social epistemology
        Bayesian analysis
        Probability theory
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          Assertions (Logic)
          Social networks
          Computer simulation
          Social epistemology
          Bayesian analysis
          Probability theory
      keyword:
        Bayesianism
        Norms of assertion
        Probability
        Social network
        Veritistic value
      ab: Epistemologists can be divided into two camps: those who think that nothing short of certainty or (subjective) probability 1 can warrant assertion and those who disagree with this claim. This paper addressed this issue by inquiring into the problem of setting the probability threshold required for assertion in such a way that that the social epistemic good is maximized, where the latter is taken to be the veritistic value in the sense of Goldman (Knowledge in a social world, ). We provide a Bayesian model of a test case involving a community of inquirers in a social network engaged in group deliberation regarding the truth or falsity of a proposition $$p.$$ Results obtained by means of computer simulation indicate that the certainty rule is optimal in the limit of inquiry and communication but that a lower threshold is preferable in less idealized cases.
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