Norms of assertion and communication in social networks.
Epistemologists can be divided into two camps: those who think that nothing short of certainty or (subjective) probability 1 can warrant assertion and those who disagree with this claim. This paper addressed this issue by inquiring into the problem of setting the probability threshold required for a...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 190; no. 13; pp. 2557 - 2572 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Sep2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Epistemologists can be divided into two camps: those who think that nothing short of certainty or (subjective) probability 1 can warrant assertion and those who disagree with this claim. This paper addressed this issue by inquiring into the problem of setting the probability threshold required for assertion in such a way that that the social epistemic good is maximized, where the latter is taken to be the veritistic value in the sense of Goldman (Knowledge in a social world, ). We provide a Bayesian model of a test case involving a community of inquirers in a social network engaged in group deliberation regarding the truth or falsity of a proposition $$p.$$ Results obtained by means of computer simulation indicate that the certainty rule is optimal in the limit of inquiry and communication but that a lower threshold is preferable in less idealized cases. |
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