Independent Service Operators in ATM Markets.
This paper studies the impact of entry of non-banks (termed Independent Service Operators, ISOs) into ATM markets. We compare two different regimes by which the ISO may generate income: (1) The ISO receives interchange fees and (2) the ISO charges consumers directly. We find that due to the entry of...
| Publicado en: | Scottish Journal of Political Economy Vol. 61; no. 1; pp. 26 - 48 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Feb2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=92674058&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 92674058 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00369292 SJP jtl: Scottish Journal of Political Economy issn: 00369292 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Feb2014 vid: 61 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 92674058 10.1111/sjpe.12033 ppf: 26 ppct: 22 formats: tig: atl: Independent Service Operators in ATM Markets. aug: au: Wenzel, Tobias affil: Universität Düsseldorf su: Automated teller machines Automated teller machines -- Service charges Bank service charges Foreign exchange rates Bank customers sug: subj: Automated teller machines Automated teller machines -- Service charges Bank service charges Foreign exchange rates Bank customers ab: This paper studies the impact of entry of non-banks (termed Independent Service Operators, ISOs) into ATM markets. We compare two different regimes by which the ISO may generate income: (1) The ISO receives interchange fees and (2) the ISO charges consumers directly. We find that due to the entry of an ISO, the size of the total ATM network increases independent of the way the ISO is financed. Account fees increase if the ISO receives interchange fees and decrease if the ISO charges consumers directly. Consumers may not benefit from the entry of the ISO. If a regulator can control the interchange fee, entry by an ISO financed through interchange fees increases consumer surplus, while the entry of a surcharging ISO decreases consumer surplus. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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