VOTING FOR INCOME-IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER-RICHARD MODEL.
This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income-redist...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 682 - 696 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2014
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=94631087&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 94631087 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2014 vid: 52 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 94631087 10.1111/ecin.12059 ppf: 682 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 797KB tig: atl: VOTING FOR INCOME-IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER-RICHARD MODEL. aug: au: BARNETT, RICHARD C. BHATTACHARYA, JOYDEEP BUNZEL, HELLE affil: Barnett: Clinical Professor, School of Economics, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Phone 215 ‐ 895 ‐ 6972, E ‐ mail Bhattacharya: Professor, DepartmENt of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011 ‐ 1070. Phone 515 ‐ 294 ‐ 5886, E ‐ mail Bunzel: Associate Professor, DepartmENt of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011 ‐ 1070. Phone 515 ‐ 294 ‐ 6163, E ‐ mail su: Income redistribution Voting Income tax Taxation Poor people Income Economics Democracy & economics sug: subj: Income redistribution Voting Income tax Taxation Poor people Income Economics Public Finance Activities Democracy & economics ab: This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income-redistribution program that finances a lump-sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political-equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility-wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility. (JEL H2, E6, D72 ) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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