VOTING FOR INCOME-IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER-RICHARD MODEL.

This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income-redist...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Economic Inquiry Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 682 - 696
Autores principales:	BARNETT, RICHARD C., BHATTACHARYA, JOYDEEP, BUNZEL, HELLE
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Apr2014
Materias:	Income redistribution Voting Income tax Taxation Poor people Income Economics Democracy & economics
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost