Communication and authority with a partially informed expert.

A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effect...

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Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 45; no. 1; pp. 176 - 198
Autores principales:	Agastya, Murali, Bag, Parimal Kanti, Chakraborty, Indranil
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Spring2014
Materias:	Communication Uncertainty Games Delegation of authority Loss functions (Statistics) Statistical bias
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost