Communication and authority with a partially informed expert.
A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effect...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 45; no. 1; pp. 176 - 198 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=95094652&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 95094652 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2014 vid: 45 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 95094652 10.1111/1756-2171.12047 ppf: 176 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 287KB tig: atl: Communication and authority with a partially informed expert. aug: au: Agastya, Murali Bag, Parimal Kanti Chakraborty, Indranil affil: University of Sydney, Australia, and Visiting Faculty, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore India National University of Singapore, Singapore su: Communication Uncertainty Games Delegation of authority Loss functions (Statistics) Statistical bias sug: subj: Communication Uncertainty Games Delegation of authority Doll, Toy, and Game Manufacturing Hobby, Toy, and Game Stores Toy and Hobby Goods and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers Loss functions (Statistics) Statistical bias ab: A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players' preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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