Why Dennett cannot explain what it is to adopt the intentional stance.
Discusses Daniel Dennett's notion of intentional states. Argument of Dennett that intentional states should not be thought of resembling theoretical entities; Major virtue of Dennett's theory; Adaption by Dennett of Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of intentional stance; Loopholes of Dennett's philosoph...
| Published in: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 46; no. 182; pp. 93 - 99 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan96
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Discusses Daniel Dennett's notion of intentional states. Argument of Dennett that intentional states should not be thought of resembling theoretical entities; Major virtue of Dennett's theory; Adaption by Dennett of Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of intentional stance; Loopholes of Dennett's philosophical tenets. |
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