IN DEFENSE OF THE COMPOSSIBILITY OF PRESENTISM AND TIME TRAVEL.
In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist's model of time leaves nowhere to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the f...
| Publicado en: | Logos & Episteme Vol. 5; no. 2; pp. 141 - 160 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Logos & Episteme
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist's model of time leaves nowhere to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of the objections fail. |
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