IN DEFENSE OF THE COMPOSSIBILITY OF PRESENTISM AND TIME TRAVEL.

In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist's model of time leaves nowhere to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the f...

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Publicado en:Logos & Episteme Vol. 5; no. 2; pp. 141 - 160
Autor principal: Hall, Thomas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Logos & Episteme 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Presentism (Philosophy)
        Time travel
        Philosophy of time
        Spacetime
        Suicide
        Philosophers
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        subj:
          Presentism (Philosophy)
          Time travel
          Philosophy of time
          Spacetime
          Suicide
          Philosophers
      keyword:
        nowhere argument
        presentism
        suicide machine argument
        time travel
      ab: In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist's model of time leaves nowhere to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of the objections fail.
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