A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism.
In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the 'Two Visual Systems Hypothe...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 191; no. 16; pp. 3919 - 3935 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Nov2014
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the 'Two Visual Systems Hypothesis' notably defended by Melvyn Goodale and David Milner. |
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