A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism.

In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the 'Two Visual Systems Hypothe...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 191; no. 16; pp. 3919 - 3935
Autor principal: Tiehen, Justin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Nov2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Tiehen, Justin
        affil: University of Puget Sound, Tacoma USA
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        Conceptualism
        Functionalism (Psychology)
        Holism
        Graphics processing units
        Criminal intent
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          Conceptualism
          Functionalism (Psychology)
          Holism
          Graphics processing units
          Criminal intent
      keyword:
        Concepts
        Functionalism
        Nonconceptual content
        Two visual systems hypothesis
      ab: In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the 'Two Visual Systems Hypothesis' notably defended by Melvyn Goodale and David Milner.
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    language: English
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