Uncertainty, Learning, and the 'Problem' of Dilation.

Imprecise probabilism-which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions-apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by...

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Published in:Erkenntnis Vol. 79; no. 6; pp. 1287 - 1304
Main Authors: Bradley, Seamus, Steele, Katie
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Dec2014
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Uncertainty, Learning, and the 'Problem' of Dilation.
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        au:
          Bradley, Seamus
          Steele, Katie
        affil:
          Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich Germany
          Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Houghton St London WC2A 2AE UK
      su:
        Uncertainty
        Learning
        Dilation theory (Operator theory)
        Belief & doubt
        Probabilism
        Probability theory
      sug:
        subj:
          Uncertainty
          Learning
          Dilation theory (Operator theory)
          Belief & doubt
          Probabilism
          Probability theory
      ab: Imprecise probabilism-which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set of probability functions-apparently suffers from a problem known as dilation. We explore whether this problem can be avoided or mitigated by one of the following strategies: (a) modifying the rule by which the credal state is updated, (b) restricting the domain of reasonable credal states to those that preclude dilation.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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