INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL.
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro-social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative beha...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 53; no. 1; pp. 557 - 574 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=99542679&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 99542679 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2015 vid: 53 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 99542679 10.1111/ecin.12134 ppf: 557 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 620KB tig: atl: INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL. aug: au: Greiff, Matthias Paetzel, Fabian affil: Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, VWL VI, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Licher Str. 66, Giessen 38394 Germany Assistant Professor, Centre for Social Policy Research, University of Bremen, Mary ‐ Somerville ‐ Str. 5, Bremen 28359 Germany su: Social acceptance Interpersonal relations research Reputation Public goods Endowments sug: subj: Social acceptance Interpersonal relations research Reputation Public goods Grantmaking Foundations Endowments ab: We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro-social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative behavior even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. The expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions. ( JEL C72, C91, D71, D83) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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