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INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL.

We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro-social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative beha...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 53; no. 1; pp. 557 - 574
Autores principales: Greiff, Matthias, Paetzel, Fabian
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jan2015
Materias:
Social acceptance
Interpersonal relations research
Reputation
Public goods
Endowments
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost