Severe Tests in Neuroimaging: What We Can Learn and How We Can Learn It.
Considerable methodological difficulties abound in neuroimaging, and several philosophers of science have recently called into question the potential of neuroimaging studies to contribute to our knowledge of human cognition. These skeptical accounts suggest that functional hypotheses are underdeterm...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 81; no. 5; pp. 961 - 974 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Dec2014
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=99660743&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 99660743 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2014 vid: 81 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 99660743 10.1086/677691 ppf: 961 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 336KB tig: atl: Severe Tests in Neuroimaging: What We Can Learn and How We Can Learn It. aug: au: Aktunc, M. Emrah su: Brain imaging Philosophy of science Cognition Inference (Logic) Cognitive neuroscience sug: subj: Brain imaging Philosophy of science Cognition Inference (Logic) Cognitive neuroscience ab: Considerable methodological difficulties abound in neuroimaging, and several philosophers of science have recently called into question the potential of neuroimaging studies to contribute to our knowledge of human cognition. These skeptical accounts suggest that functional hypotheses are underdetermined by neuroimaging data. I apply Mayo's error-statistical account to clarify the evidential import of neuroimaging data and the kinds of inferences it can reliably support. Thus, we can answer the question "What can we reliably learn from neuroimaging?" and make sense of how this knowledge can contribute to novel construals of cognition. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2014 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|